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  ABSTRACT 
 
As one of Kyoto’s three flexibility mechanisms for reducing the cost of compliance, 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows the issuance of Certified Emission Reduction 
(CER) credits from offset projects in non-Annex I countries. Whilst much attention has focused 
on the widespread use of the mechanism by China and India, the complex project cycle, and 
the lack of convincing baselines, little attention has been paid to the financing of CDM projects. 
In this paper we assess the extent to which CDM projects with public bodies should utilise debt 
swaps as a form of finance. The paper does this through analysing the use of a debt swap 
between Uruguay and Spain within a CDM wind farm project in Uruguay. The paper assesses 
this transaction according to a simple framework by which debt swaps can be evaluated: 
whether it delivers additional resources to the debtor country and/or debtor government budget; 
whether it delivers more resources for climate purposes; whether it has a sizeable effect on 
overall debt burdens (thereby creating ‘indirect’ benefits); and whether it adheres to the 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In addition to an implicit technology transfer mandate, the original aims of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) were threefold: to facilitate mitigation efforts in non-
Annex I countries; to promote sustainable development; and to reduce abatement costs for 
Annex I parties. For example, within the Kyoto Protocol Article 12 states that the ‘purpose of the 
clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving 
sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to 
assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments’ (UNFCCC, 1997, p.11). Put simply, through the CDM, 
project developers, such as private companies, government or non-governmental organisations, 
are able to sell offset credits to companies and governments in Annex I countries that are 
committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions.
1 To try and ensure their integrity, these 
offsets are certified by the Executive Board of the CDM (and can also be certified by further 
accreditation schemes) (see World Bank, 2009). The CDM has particularly encouraged 
investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency in developing countries (UNFCCC, 
2008a; World Bank, 2009). 
 
The impact and process of the CDM has been criticised on a number of grounds 
(see Kolshus et al., 2001; Olsen, 2007; Olsen and Feenan, 2008; Schneider, 2007; Paulsson, 
2009; Boyd et al., 2009; Rahman et al., 2010). First, the issue of supplementarity; in other 
words, the extent to which countries can reduce emissions through using the CDM without 
cutting their own emissions. Currently, under the Kyoto Protocol, there is no cap on the use of 
the mechanism (although domestic reductions are supposed to contribute a ‘significant element’ 
of national efforts). Second, the types of projects supported. For example, most CERs have 
been issued for the reduction of industrial gases (such as potent hydrofluorocarbons or nitrous 
oxides) due the very low abatement costs. Such projects require heavy industries that need 
cleaning up, which excludes the vast majority of developing countries (and partly explains why 
China and India have utilised the mechanism so extensively).  
 
Third, and a further reason for the unequal spatial distribution of CDM projects, has 
been the CDM’s complex eight-stage project cycle (including the involvement of firms - termed 
Designated Operating Entities (DOEs) - accredited to validate and certify project activities). The 
complexity of the process has acted as an entry barrier for actors, particularly in Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). A related issue has been the uneven performance of DOEs in 
ensuring the integrity of project proposals (leading to an increasing proportion being rejected by 
the Executive Board - see Schneider, 2007).  
 
A fourth criticism focuses on the lack of convincing project baselines. A baseline is 
defined  by the UNFCCC as ‘the scenario that reasonably represents the anthropogenic 
emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that would occur in the absence of the proposed 
project activity’ (UNFCCC, 2002, p.36). Thus, baselines are a counterfactual scenario where, 
                                                 
1 Within the Marrakesh Accord it was agreed that afforestation and reforestation projects could be included 
as eligible CDM offset schemes (but not avoided deforestation or degradation schemes). This was agreed 
for the first commitment period (ending in 2012) and with a limit that Annex I countries could only purchase 
up to 5% of 1990 emission levels (Dessai and Schipper, 2003). Such limits have proved superfluous as 
very few afforestation and reforestation CDM projects have been credited with CERs. Surprisingly, 
reduced deforestation and degradation in developing countries was designated as an adaptation activity 
eligible for funding through the Adaptation Fund (which takes a 2% levy from the CDM).    
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unless a pipeline approach is utilised, it is difficult to establish the hypothetical emission trend 
with a great degree of precision. Importantly, as CERs are used to offset emissions in Annex I 
countries, if CDM project baselines are inflated the CDM could  increase  total emissions. 
Therefore it is vital that baselines are calculated conservatively. Baselines can be calculated 
one of three ways: existing/historical emissions; emissions from an economically attractive 
course of action; or the comparable average emissions from projects undertaken in the previous 
five years under similar circumstances, whose performance is among the top 20% of their 
category. As a result, using different methodologies can lead to different baseline levels and 
thus different CER issuance (see Paulsson, 2009).  
 
A fifth issue concerns the extent to which the CDM project in question is additional 
to actors’ business-as-usual investments (see Schneider, 2007; Paulsson, 2009). In a similar 
vein to project baselines, this is important to maintain the environmental integrity of the CDM 
(and often relies on a hypothetical scenario). Projects have to prove investment additionality to 
ensure that the CDM precipitates new and innovative investments and not just pre-existing 
investments packaged up as an offset scheme. There are four main ways in which this is 
achieved:  financial additionality (where the revenue from offset credits makes the project 
financially viable); barrier additionality (where project developers illustrate how the CDM helps 
to overcome barriers to entry); comparison additionality (where project developers argue that an 
innovative project is financially less viable than one or more plausible comparators); and, lastly, 
common practice additionality (where it is demonstrated that the project is a substantial 
innovation in the sector). When assessing almost a hundred projects, Schneider (2007) argues 
that the claims of investment additionality by project developers is often not robust enough, 
citing the submission of weak evidence for projects claiming barrier and comparison 
additionality.  
 
A sixth criticism focuses on the extent to which the CDM has created sustainable 
development co-benefits. Whilst this was a key aim of the CDM, the extent to which it has been 
realised is under considerable debate. For example, Schneider (2007) argues strongly that 
whilst the CDM has facilitated low-cost mitigation projects, it has not met its mandate to 
contribute to sustainable development. The extent to which projects do contribute is assessed 
by host country governments, who, according to Schneider (2007), support projects which may 
only generate limited benefits (such as a modest amount of employment). A further indirect 
channel through which governments can judge projects to be developmental is through 
increasing government revenues. For instance, industrial gas offset projects provide very limited 
direct development benefits, but the taxation of the CERs issued and sold, as practiced by 
China, can be developmental (especially if ring-fenced for development purposes).  
 
A seventh concern focuses on the lack of project finance for CDM projects in LDCs 
(in addition to a lack of human and institutional capacity). For example, as there is a 
considerable lag between the revenue stream from projects, and planning and construction 
costs, considerable project finance is required in the form of equity, loans or grants (see UNEP, 
2007). As investments in LDCs carry an additional risk premium compared to developed and 
emerging economies (due not least to weak governance and fragmented capital markets), there 
has been a large financing gap which has stymied LDC participation in the CDM.  A number of 
initiatives have been put in place to help overcome this financing gap. For example, a 
programmatic approach to CDM has been developed since the eleventh Conference of Parties 
in Montreal. Here, a number of identical projects within a certain geographical area are bundled  
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together for assessment and crediting (reducing transaction costs, improving economies of 
scale and the scope of project types) (see Chassard, 2008). Moreover, there have been 
changes in regulation. For example, the EU will only purchase CERs from projects registered 
from 2013 onwards if those projects are in LDCs.  
 
This paper focuses on these last two concerns by gauging the extent to which 
development co-benefits and access to project finance can be improved for (partly) publically-
financed CDM projects through the use of debt-for-efficiency swaps (in other words, the 
exchange of outstanding foreign debt for a commitment by the debtor government to invest in 
clean energy projects). The paper does this through analysing the use of a recent debt swap 
between Uruguay and Spain to finance a CDM wind farm project in Uruguay.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 offers a concise history of debt-
for-development swaps, discusses Spain’s role as an important proponent of swaps, and 
introduces the details of the Spanish-Uruguayan swap analysed here. The third section 
assesses the swap in terms of a simple framework proposed by Cassimon et al.  (2011a): 
whether they deliver additional resources to the debtor country and/or debtor government 
budget; whether they deliver more resources for climate purposes; whether they have a 
sizeable effect on overall debt burdens; and whether they adhere to the principles of alignment 
with government policy and systems. Section 4 discusses whether the use of debt swaps 
supports the development co-benefit aims of the CDM, and improves access to project finance, 
before broadening out to discuss the extent to which debt swaps could play a meaningful role 
within climate finance.   
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2.  TO SWAP OR NOT TO SWAP - DEBT’S THE QUESTION 
 
2.1.  A cursory history of debt-for-development swaps
2 
 
Restructuring and relieving the debt of developing countries goes back a long way, 
at least to the early years of post-war history.
3 In the beginning, debt restructuring was very 
much dominated by short-term consolidations of debt titles owed by developing countries to 
their official bilateral creditors. To ensure the smooth working of such debt renegotiations, in 
1956 the Paris Club was set up, an informal and voluntary grouping of bilateral creditor nations 
that continues to play a key role in today’s decision-making on debt relief issues (see Cosio-
Pascal, 2008). 
 
Debt crises engulfing a swathe of developing countries (mostly Latin American) in 
the 1970s and 1980s also spawned the restructuring of commercial debt, sometimes through 
bank advisory committees (such as the so-called ‘London Club’). Especially after 1982, the year 
of Mexico’s default, the secondary market for discounted debt expanded rapidly (see Buckley, 
1997). The abundance of bad loans traded on such markets led in 1985 to the birth of debt-for-
equity conversions,  a practice whereby investors redeem external debt titles (bought at a 
discount) with the debtor country in exchange for local currency to be used for equity investment 
in national companies. The great attraction of the debt-for-equity concept was that debtor 
countries would see part of their debt cancelled, whereas foreign investors could obtain stock 
holdings at advantageous exchange rates (Buckley, 2009a). Debt-for-equity swaps experienced 
a boom in the late-1980s, a time where privatisation was widely seen as a solution for inefficient 
state-owned enterprises. In 1990, in the course of the Brady Plan, the combined swap volume 




Conservationists borrowed these debt-for-equity principles to lobby for debt-for-
nature exchanges from the mid-1980s onwards.
5  Environmental NGOs were encouraged to 
acquire discounted debt titles on the secondary market and swap them for local currency 
counterpart funds supporting in-country environmental projects (or for debtor country 
commitments to continuously protect designated areas). This would bring about a double 
dividend: a reduction of developing countries’ hard currency needs for debt servicing (often 
financed by environmentally-degrading natural resource extraction) at the same time as 
mobilising additional funds for conservation purposes (Jha and Schatan, 2001; Sheikh, 2010). 
The first debt-for-nature agreement, a deal between Conservation International and Bolivia on 
forest conservation and biosphere management, was signed in July 1987. It is estimated that 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of this paper we restrict ourselves here to a discussion of debt-for-development swaps, 
i.e. the practice of exchanging debt claims with the debtor country for development-related domestic 
spending (including on conservation and climate goals). Many other forms of debt swaps  exist, some of 
which are touched upon in the text. 
3 For a concise and lucid overview of debt relief history, see Gamarra et al. (2009). 
4 The Brady Plan, launched in 1989 and named after then US Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady, 
offered commercial banks with claims on (mostly Latin American) developing countries a menu of options 
to swap these debt titles for new bonds with lower nominal value (below par) and/or reduced interest rates 
(‘exit options’); alternatively banks could choose to retain their exposure but provide additional credit to 
compensate for any capital gains due to the reduced indebtedness of creditor countries (‘new money 
options’). The Brady plan resulted in deals typically involving several hundreds of millions of US$ per 
country (see Claessens and Diwan, 1994; Vásquez, 1996). 
5 The idea of transplanting the debt-for-equity philosophy to environmental protection is generally ascribed 
to Dr. Thomas Lovejoy, a former vice-president of the World Wildlife Fund (see Lovejoy, 1984).  
Financing the CDM through debt-for-efficiency swaps?  IOB Working Paper / 2011.06 - 11 -     
from 1987 to 1997 about US$ 134 million worth of commercial developing country debt 
(purchased at an average discount of 78%) was channelled through the debt-for-nature 
mechanism, generating US$ 126 million in local currency counterpart funds (Development 
Finance International, 2009). 
 
The decision of the Paris Club in 1990 to allow its creditor members to convert all 
of their official concessional claims (and part of their non-concessional titles) into counterpart 
funds with social or environmental objectives added further to the popularity of debt-for-nature 
swaps. Next to other early swap proponents such as Canada, Germany and Switzerland (see 
Moye, 2003), the US has played a key role, first through the 1990 Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative (EAI) and, later, the 1998 Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA), a programme for 
bilateral debt restructuring where freed-up resources are directed toward tropical forest 
conservation in eligible debtor countries (see Sheikh, 2010 for details).  
 
Despite initiatives such as the TFCA, the use of debt swaps for environmental 
purposes declined from the mid-1990s. One reason has been the appreciation of the secondary 
market value of commercial debt titles, induced, at least partially, by improvements in the overall 
solvency of debtor economies (partly a result of previous debt relief efforts) (Ruiz, 2007). This 
made it harder for environmental NGOs to strike a financially attractive agreement. Second, and 
more important for the purpose of the current article, the debt swap mechanism became subject 
to numerous  critiques regarding its failure to generate additional resources for the debtor 
country or sectoral/public good goals, its insufficient scale and the inappropriateness of 
conditionalities attached to it (see Section 3). In response, debt relief practice (of bilateral, 
multilateral and, to some extent, commercial creditors) evolved into much more comprehensive, 
larger-scale schemes such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative and its 
successor, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), with greater attention to policy and 
system alignment under the form of Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) conditionality.
6  
 
Nevertheless, bilateral debt swaps now seem to have re-captured policymakers’ 
attention. Recent years have seen a remarkable surge in the number of new swap initiatives in 
various sectors, most notably health and education (see Filmus and Serrani, 2009; Global Fund 
to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2007).
7 Debt-for-nature swaps have been no exception 
to this trend. Following a relatively quiet period, the US has recently concluded deals with Peru, 
Indonesia and Brazil under the TFCA (see Sheikh, 2010;  USAID, 2011). Other bilateral 
creditors, such as Germany and France have also jumped on the bandwagon (see e.g. Buckley, 
2011). Above all, however, Spain has positioned itself as a leading proponent of debt swaps (in 
                                                 
6 In 1996 the IMF and the World Bank jointly initiated the HIPC Initiative to bring debt burdens of a number 
of severely-indebted developing countries back to sustainable levels. Bilateral, multilateral and commercial 
creditors were all requested to contribute in proportion to their debt exposure. The Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative in 1999 carried this logic further by deepening relief, increasing flexibility of the original initiative, 
and making debtor country participation conditional upon the preparation and implementation of a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a country-owned document describing the debtor’s medium-term 
structural and social policy for poverty reduction. Finally, in 2005, the IMF, World Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA) and African Development Fund committed themselves to forgive the 
remaining debt owed to them by post-completion point HIPCs through the MDRI. The Inter-American 
Development Bank launched a similar initiative in 2007. As of December 2010, HIPC/MDRI debt 
cancellation packages have been approved for 36 countries (with another 4 countries on the waiting list). 
These commitments represent approximately US$ 127 billion of debt relief in nominal terms (see IDA and 
IMF, 2010). 
7 For example cases and a detailed critique of such debt-for-health and debt-for-education swaps, see 
Cassimon et al. (2008; 2011b).  
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2.2.  Spain as a key proponent of debt swaps 
 
Compared with smaller bilateral creditors, such as Switzerland and Belgium, that 
were debt-for-development swap pioneers in the 1990s but have now discontinued their debt 
swap programmes
8, Spain’s debt swap activities have blossomed rather late. Between January 
1999 and January 2011 Spain signed no less than 37 debt swaps with 23 low- and middle-
income countries in the area of social development. In nominal terms a total of approximately 
EUR923 million worth of debt was cancelled, while agreed counterpart payments amounted to 
about EUR491 million.
9  The majority of these swap agreements, 24 swaps representing 
EUR695 million in debt claims, were concluded in the latter half of this twelve-year period. 
 
Initially, Spanish debt swaps were conducted primarily with Latin American 
countries, both countries participating in the HIPC initiative (Honduras, Nicaragua and Bolivia) 
and non-HIPCs (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay), in the areas of infrastructure, 
health, education and environmental conservation. In 2004, at the UN Summit for Action against 
Hunger and Poverty, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodrígez Zapatero announced that 
Spain, beyond its HIPC commitments, envisaged being ‘actively involved in debt-for-social-
development swap operations, especially in the area of primary education’.
10 Such statements, 
together with heavy lobbying of Latin American governments, regional intergovernmental 
organisations and civil society, translated into a series of debt-for-education swaps in 2005-
2007 (see Navarro, 2006 and Vera, 2007). Throughout this period, Spain adopted a 
differentiated debt swap policy, granting a discount of 40% on the counterpart payments due by 
HIPC debtor countries whilst requesting full payments from non-HIPCs. 
 
At the end of 2006 a new law on external debt management (Law No. 38/2006 of 7 
December)
11 was approved by the Spanish Congress, making Spain Europe’s second nation 
with legislation linking debt relief to development policy (Italy introduced a similar law in 2000) 
(Filmus and Serrani, 2009). Article 5 refers specifically to the need to ensure debt swap practice 
is consistent with the framework agreed upon at the international creditor community level and 
to target those developing countries with the highest levels of external debt, preferably partner 
countries of Spain’s development policy. From recent practice, it seems that the adoption of 
Law No. 38/2006 has lead to a strategic repositioning of Spain’s policy on debt swaps. From 
                                                 
8 Switzerland is often credited with being the first donor country to use the debt-for-development swap 
instrument as  an integral part of its overall development cooperation policy. The CHF500 million 
endowment fund of the Swiss Debt Reduction Facility was set up in 1991 and eventually depleted in 2001. 
Switzerland decided to channel all remaining debt relief through the regular HIPC framework (see Buckley, 
2011).  
9 These figures were calculated from data obtained through the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
The reported EUR923 million excludes a number of debt-for-equity swaps (with Jordan, Morocco, Algeria 
and Equatorial Guinea) between 2000 and 2006, but includes swaps with Honduras and Nicaragua in 
1999 and 2000, respectively, whereby debts were directly cancelled in full (without counterpart 
commitments) in the wake of Hurricane Mitch. 
10 For a transcript of the full speech, see 
 http://www.segib.org/upload/discursodelpresidentedelgobierno.pdf. 
11 The original text of the Ley 38/2006, de 7 de diciembre, reguladora de la gestión de la deuda externa is 
available at: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2006/12/08/pdfs/A43049-43053.pdf. A translated, English version 
of Article 5 of this law (on debt conversion) can be found in Filmus and Serrani (2009, p.48).  
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2007 onward, with the exception of a deal with Paraguay, swaps have been concluded with 
HIPC countries only, many of them in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
2.3.  The Spanish-Uruguayan debt-for-efficiency swap
12 
 
The case we consider here has its origins in the Debt Conversion Programme for 
Public Investment signed between Spain and Uruguay on the 15
th of April 2003. The stated 
objectives of this conversion programme were to assist Uruguay with its precarious external 
financial situation, aggravated by Argentina’s default at the end of 2001, and, at the same time, 
promote development-oriented investment in Uruguay. To this end, over the period February 
2003 - December 2004, Spain agreed to forgive  US$9,324,769 worth of principal and interest 
owed by Uruguay to the Fondo de Ayuda al Desarollo (FAD) (Spain’s main concessional loan 
institution for export promotion), in exchange for a guarantee from the Uruguayan government 
to deposit an equivalent sum (in US$) into a newly created counterpart fund held in a bank 
account in Uruguay (at the pace of the original debt service becoming due). It was decided that, 
from this fund, Uruguay would finance a number of previously identified infrastructure projects, 
i.e. the construction of three liquid waste treatment plants in the Uruguayan departments of 
Canelones, San José and Cerro Largo. 
 
On the 18
th March of 2005, the newly elected Uruguayan Minister of Economics 
and Finance Danilo Astori wrote to his Spanish counterpart - Pedro Solbes Mira - with a request 
to renew the 2003 debt conversion programme, thereby evoking a clause in the original contract 
that foresaw the possibility of extending the programme with a second phase of two more 
biannual periods. 
 
In a letter on the 10
th of May, Mr. Solbes Mira replied favourably to the Uruguayan 
request and proposed a second debt swap on the following terms. First, the new conversion 
would involve the transfer of US$10,800,571.99 of FAD debt service owed by Uruguay over the 
period July 2005 - June 2007 into the same counterpart fund (again in US$ and following the 
original debt schedule).
13  Second, the structure, management and the workings of the 
counterpart fund would proceed as stipulated in the original 2003 agreement. This means that a 
bi-national Spanish-Uruguayan committee, consisting of representatives designated by the 
Ministries of Economics of both countries, would oversee the fund and have the final word on 
the selection of projects financed by it. The committee would also have the possibility to appoint 
other observers that could assist in technical matters. Once a project was selected, a technical 
team from the Uruguayan Ministry of Economics and Finance would write out the necessary 
specifications and launch a call for proposals. The bidding itself would be limited to Spanish 
companies or ventures employing equipment and/or services supplied by Spanish companies. 
The final decision on the assignment of projects and supervision of their execution would rest 
with the bi-national committee. Third, Mr. Solbes Mira suggested to build on the first leg of the 
debt conversion and direct the resources released by the swap towards a sustainable 
development investment in Uruguay, conforming to the Kyoto Protocol (which entered into force 
                                                 
12 This section draws on the information we have been able to extract from original project documents, 
including the debt swap agreement, the CDM project design document and formal letters, as well as from 
correspondence with some of the officials involved. All documents (most of them in Spanish) are available 
from the authors upon request. 
13 These FAD credits were concessional loans granted to Uruguay in the years 1990 to 1994.  
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in February 2005). Importantly, any CER credits generated by such sustainable development 
projects would be offered to Spain first. Mr. Astori formally accepted these terms on the 31
st of 
May 2005.  
 
A meeting in Montevideo in November 2005 of the bi-national committee approved 
the project that would ultimately benefit from the debt swap: the implementation of a 10 MW 
grid-connected wind power farm in Sierra de los Caracoles, a gently undulating area in the 
department of Maldonado, Southern Uruguay (about 300 metres above sea level).
14  
 
The project was conceived as a CDM project with a total estimated cost of just over 
US$30 million. The debt swap under scrutiny thus accounts for approximately one third of this 
(the aforementioned US$10.8 million). The Administración Nacional de Usinas y Trasmisiones 
Eléctricas (UTE), Uruguay’s state-owned national electricity company managing the wind farm, 
shoulders the largest part of the costs involved, US$18.9 million, and the Spanish Carbon 
Fund
15 contributes another EUR730,000.  
 
In mid-2007 an evaluation of offers responding to a public tender resulted in 
Eduinter, a Spanish infrastructure and service company specialised in renewable energy, being 
awarded the Sierra de los Caracoles project. Eduinter committed to supply five wind turbine 
generators with a capacity of 2MW each from Vestas (a Danish manufacturer).
16 The first V-80 
wind turbine went into operation in November 2008 and by mid-January 2009 all turbines were 
supplying electricity to the grid. 
 
After UTE and the World Bank signed a letter of intent for the potential purchase of 
CERs in January 2009, the annual emission reduction was estimated at 25,554 tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalents (tCO2e). This corresponds to the generation of 178,878 CERs during 
the first seven-year crediting period (2010-2016).
17  
 
At first glance, the just-described debt swap instrument appears as a win-win 
scenario. Uruguay reduces its debt burden and frees up resources for environmental spending 
while Spain sees an increase in the value of remaining Uruguayan debt claims, improves its 
environmental credentials, promotes Spanish investment and guarantees a supply of CERs to 
meet its Kyoto commitments. However, as we will show in the remainder of this paper, it is far 





                                                 
14 Technical assistance in developing the project proposal was provided by a committee comprised of the 
National Directory of Energy and Nuclear Technology of the Uruguayan Ministry of Industry, Energy and 
Mining (MIEM) and the engineering faculty of the Universidad de la República (UDELAR). 
15 The Spanish Carbon Fund is a public-private partnership managed by the World Bank for the account of 
the Spanish government. Since 2005 the Fund  has been active in purchasing greenhouse gas emission 
reductions to assist Spain in fulfilling its emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Up to 
date it has signed 23 Emission Reductions Purchase Agreements (ERPAs) with 13 countries (see 
http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=SCF&ItemID=9714&FID=9714). Currently, the World Bank 
also administers Italian, Dutch and Danish carbon funds, together with a number of specialised carbon-
related facilities in which various governments, corporations and international organisations participate. 
16 The other contender for the project (who made it to the final round) was Control Y Montajes Industriales 
(CYMI), another Spanish industrial service provider, which proposed to install German VENSYS turbines. 
17  Crediting can be renewed for two further seven-year terms subject to DOE and Executive Board 
approval (see UNFCCC, 2002, p.37).  
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3.  ASSESSMENT OF THE SPANISH-URUGUAYAN DEBT-FOR-
EFFICIENCY SWAP  
 
Debt swaps can be assessed according to a simple five-part framework (see 
Cassimon et al., 2011a): whether they deliver additional resources to the debtor country and/or 
debtor government budget; whether they deliver more resources for climate purposes; whether 
they have a sizeable effect on overall debt burdens (thereby creating ‘indirect’ benefits); and 
whether they adhere to the principles of alignment with government policy and systems (two key 
elements within the new aid approach). We now discuss each of these issues in turn, first 




3.1.  Delivering additional resources to the debtor country and/or debtor 
government budget 
 
As with any other form of debt relief, debt swaps are supposed to increase net 
external financial transfers to the recipient country. As the contractual external debt service, 
typically in foreign currency, does no longer have to be made, it frees up foreign currency for 
alternative use, and increases net international purchasing power of the recipient country (as 
such creating ‘external space’). Moreover, to the extent that swaps deal with public debt, they 
also allow the recipient country government to divert part of its budgetary resources, otherwise 
spent on debt service, to other means such as increased spending, say on environmental 
issues, either domestically or abroad (i.e. in foreign currency), or just to reduce the fiscal deficit; 
as such, debt swaps are also said to create ‘fiscal space’ (Heller, 2005). However, at least four 
important qualifications apply here, of which three pertain both to the external as well as the 
fiscal dimension (the last one usually applies to fiscal space only).  
        
First, debt relief savings are only realised gradually, typically over many years or 
even decades, depending on the contractual repayment terms and schedule of the underlying 
debt. The reported nominal value of the cancelled debt in a swap is therefore not necessarily a 
good measure of the increase in available resources at the level of the debtor country. The 
present value (PV) of future debt service payments that are forgiven (discounted at the interest 
rate at which the debtor country can raise this amount of money on international markets) is 
arguably a better proxy. In particular, when debt is highly concessional, with long maturity and 
repayment periods and below-market interest rates, as is the case with claims accounted for as 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), PV gains in international purchasing power for the debt 
relief recipient will be appreciably lower than nominal figures suggest. 
 
Second, only that share of debt service that would have been paid to the creditor in 
the absence of any debt relief will generate genuinely new resources for the debtor country. To 
take for granted that all debt would have been fully serviced without the swap arrangement (in 
other words, assuming the probability of default to be zero) could be far too optimistic, 
especially when a country is experiencing debt service problems. At the extreme, contractual  
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debt service savings could be entirely fictitious, not creating any external nor fiscal space 
whatsoever (as debt would not have been paid at all).
18   
 
Third, one can assume debt swaps to be entirely additional to other forms of donor 
support. However, debt swaps may well crowd out other, possibly more appropriate, forms of 
aid since current accounting rules allow donors to treat debt relief operations as substitutes for 
new aid.
19  Donors could hence see debt swaps as an attractive option to boost their ODA 
figures, leading to reduced expenditures on other categories of ODA. Moreover, since the 
nominal value of debt swap operations is typically an overestimation of both the debtor’s benefit 
and the creditor’s cost, a swap may provide fewer resources than other aid interventions, say, 
direct budget support. Empirical studies on the first generation of swaps indicate, if anything, 
that they have not been additional to other sources of donor support (see e.g. Ndikumana, 
2004). 
 
The fourth qualification is particular for debt relief offered through the swap 
modality. As explained earlier, in a debt swap, and in exchange for the cancelled debt service, 
the debtor is required to make counterpart payments, typically (but not necessarily) in local 
currency, typically (but again not necessarily) at a discount (relative to the nominal amount of 
debt cancelled). In principle the discount, if applied, should reflect the first and second 
qualifications raised, i.e. it should reflect the potential discrepancy between the nominal and the 
market value of the debt relieved. If not, no additional budgetary room will be freed up to the 
benefit of the recipient country government; on the contrary, fiscal space will be destroyed. 
Moreover, there may be a conflict between the timing  of annual debt savings and that of 
domestic counterpart obligations. In contrast to the typically slowly maturing debt service 
payments, domestic counterpart payments are sometimes frontloaded, becoming due within a 
much shorter period of time. A poorly structured debt swap where annual domestic counterpart 
payments occur prior to the realisation of debt relief savings may therefore increase fiscal 
pressures for the government rather than relaxing them, at least in these first years. All depends 
on how the PVs of debt service payments and domestic counterpart payments compare. This 
potential problem can easily be avoided by perfectly matching the timing of contractual debt 
service cancelled with the schedule of counterpart payments.
20 If counterpart payments are due 
in local currency, as typically is the case, this fourth qualification applies to fiscal space only. But 
in practice we sometimes witness swaps that require debtors to make counterpart payments in 
hard currency; in this case the argument also applies to the foreign exchange component 
(external space).    
 
                                                 
18 These two first qualifications give rise to the concept of the ‘economic value’ of debt (relief), i.e. the PV 
of the debt that would have  been effectively serviced in the absence of the debt relief (debt swap) 
intervention, as the most appropriate indicator to measure the value of debt, and the value of debt relief (to 
the recipient country). For a more formal explanation of this economic value concept, see Cassimon and 
Vaessen (2007). 
19 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the most important body for measuring 
and publishing donor aid efforts, allows the full nominal value of debt relief to be counted for as ODA. Of 
course, to avoid double counting, for loans that already previously qualified as ODA and are later subject 
to debt swaps only the redirection of the interest component (and not the principal) is recorded as new 
ODA. 
20 On the other hand, from the perspective of the counterpart fund management, who typically wants to 
make a noticeable impact by spending sizeable amounts at once, the issue becomes to bring forward as 
much of the available resources as possible. One way of resolving this inherent tension is for the 
government to issue bonds whose repayment is backed by the stream of future counterpart payments.   
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Given this basic reasoning and qualifications, how can we assess the concrete 
case under consideration here, from the perspective of freeing up resources at the recipient 
country and government budget level? Applying the different qualifications, we cannot  but 
conclude that, although the swap scores well on a number of characteristics, overall, it made no 
dent in creating additional space, neither external nor fiscal. On the positive side, the debt 
savings are realised over a short period of two years, so that the PV of the debt service relieved 
closely resembles the nominal value. Also, the timing of counterpart payments perfectly 
matches the contractual debt service relieved, avoiding potential negative short-term fiscal (and 
external) space problems. On the other hand, since the counterpart payments are due in US$, 
the swap does not contribute to relieving potential foreign exchange constraints (providing 
external space) at the level of the recipient country.
21 Moreover, and more importantly, the swap 
does not include a discount on these counterpart payments; in other words, the country still has 
to generate the full contractual debt service originally due in US$, the only difference of the 
swap being the transfer to the counterpart fund, instead of to the original creditor, Spain. 
  
For the case under consideration, i.e. Uruguay in the period 2003-2007, this last 
element is crucial in our assessment. It is important to note that during this period, the country 
experienced severe economic troubles as a result  of the fall-out of the 2001 Argentinean 
economic crisis. Uruguay’s banking system, highly dollarized due to its role as an offshore dollar 
deposit centre for the region, was, at that time, weakly regulated and supervised. Since 
corporate and household sectors of the economy were heavily exposed to large and unhedged 
foreign currency liabilities, the withdrawal of non-resident deposits (started by Argentinean 
nationals as a result of the crisis), followed by a generalized bank run, cascaded into a full-
blown banking, currency and debt crisis. Real GDP declined by 11% in 2002; foreign exchange 
reserves dwindled, causing the exchange rate to lose 60% of its value against the dollar; and 
public debt escalated to about 100% of GDP (see e.g. IMF, 2008a, Box 1). With considerable 
debt service obligations falling due in 2003-04, the authorities succeeded in launching a 
‘voluntary’ sovereign bond debt exchange with their private bondholder creditors in April-May 
2003, that lengthened maturities and reduced gross financing requirements on these bonds 
over the 2003-2007 period, in order to alleviate the most pressing short-term external debt 
pressures.
22  Aided by an IMF programme, the country was successful in overcoming the 
financial crisis and regaining economic stability around 2005, with further IMF programme-led 
economic adjustments until 2008. 
 
As a result of all this, serious doubts were raised about the capacity and 
willingness of the country to service its sovereign debt.
23 As such, the bilateral official claims 
that were swapped here incorporated the possibility of default, reflected in a below par 
                                                 
21 In normal times, for Uruguay this may not be such a big issue relative to other countries, due to the 
country’s status as an offshore financial centre  for  the region and the resulting high level of financial 
dollarization of its economy.   
22 As a result of the exchange, total public debt remained high in nominal terms, as nominal principal 
reduction involved was very small, but debt service was reduced considerably, especially in the first years 
after the debt exchange. Overall, external private creditors on average took a loss (a so-called ‘haircut’) of 
about 13% to 26% of exposure, according to the standard definition used (see Sturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer, 2005). Also note that this debt ‘reprofiling’ for Uruguay is now often referred to in the context 
of a (potential) debt restructuring operation for Greece (see e.g. Buchheit and Gulati, 2011). 
23 As witnessed by the increase of the sovereign spread of Uruguayan bonds, moving from about 500 
basis points before the crisis to more than 2000 basis points in  the 2002-2003  period, and the 
downgrading of these bonds to below investment grade (IMF, 2008b, p.30-40).  After the successful 
completion of the sovereign bond exchange, spreads and credit ratings eventually returned to pre-crisis 
levels.  
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economic value. In fact, the assumption that Uruguay would not have serviced these claims in 
the absence of the swap during the two swap periods under consideration cannot easily be 
discarded. Under this assumption, no external or fiscal space was created by the swap; indeed, 
the required counterpart payments would then have forced the Uruguayan government to use 
resources that were not ‘saved’ from debt service, necessitating it to cut back on other 
spending, or increase deficits (again both from an external and fiscal space perspective).     
 
 
3.2.  Delivering more resources for climate purposes 
 
Even if swapping debt does not necessarily lead to more resources available to the 
recipient country (government) overall, it is often asserted that these swaps do increase 
resources available for development, or in the case of this debt-for-efficiency swap, for climate 
purposes in general, and for investments in emission reduction technologies more particularly. 
Clearly, the embedded ‘earmarking’ of the counterpart payments for this specific purpose would 
suggest so. However, the  alleged increase critically depends on additionality in both donor 
support and government expenditure in this area. These are now discussed in turn. 
 
First of all, and related to the third argument of section 3.1, at the donor level, debt-
for-efficiency swaps may well substitute for other donor  interventions  aimed at climate 
purposes, and as such they may not be additional. Second, and in a similar vein, debt-for-
efficiency swaps do not automatically result in additional resources spent on these purposes 
within  recipient countries (Hansen, 1989). When confronted with a schedule of counterpart 
payments, governments may decide to cut back on their own efforts and reduce projected 
budget allocations for climate spending. A certain degree of so-called ‘fungibility’ is inherent to 
most aid instruments, but is often thought to be more pronounced in the case of specifically 
targeted support such as debt swaps (see e.g. Feyzioglu et al., 1998).  
 
A significant degree of additionality in a double sense, with freed-up resources 
coming on top of other donor interventions as well as budget lines already reserved by the 
recipient for clean energy investment and emission reduction, should be a necessary condition 
for the enactment of these swaps. So, how does our case perform against these two 
additionality requirements? As is often the case, it is difficult to gauge the degree of additionality 
with the information available. Only some qualified guesses can be made. From the perspective 
of the Spanish donor, it is plausible to assume that engaging in the swap has not reduced 
efforts elsewhere. In other words, it seems that Spain has exploited the opportunity to increase 
its engagement (and credentials) in the renewable energy sector. On the other hand, it seems 
less plausible to assume additionality from the perspective of the recipient country government, 
as the investment in clean energy technologies was already planned before. For Uruguay it is 
more likely that the swap helped the country to realise the necessary cuts in spending on other 
budget lines. 
 
        
3.3.  The effect on overall debt burdens 
 
Compared to other aid interventions, debt swaps may possess characteristics that 
yield effects beyond possible direct increases in resources at the country or government budget 
level. According to the so-called ‘debt overhang’ theory (see Krugman, 1988), an excessive  
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debt burden, demanding high debt service payments, may induce the government to impose 
punitive taxes on those sectors in the economy that are most productive. Such suboptimal 
behaviour could reduce investment, depress economic growth and lower government revenues, 
in turn making debt service all the more painful. Debt relief, and debt swaps for that matter, 
could break such a vicious cycle and turn it into a virtuous one. The resulting process should 
lead to greater domestic resource mobilisation, benefiting clean energy and other investment. 
Again some cautionary remarks are however in order. 
 
First, not all macro-economists fully subscribe to the simple negative relation 
between debt size and investment/growth depicted here. The theory of debt overhang has been 
said to be more relevant for middle- than for low-income countries and not valid at very high or 
low levels of debt burden (See Chauvin and Kraay, 2005; Cordella et al., 2005). Other critics 
have argued that an excessive debt burden and low growth are in itself manifestations of some 
deeper, systemic problems, whether economic, institutional or political in nature. 
 
Even if one takes the debt overhang hypothesis at face value, debt relief needs to 
reach a critical mass and be delivered in a harmonised manner to make a dent in freeing a 
country from a high debt-low growth trap. Larger-scale initiatives such as the Brady deals and 
the HIPC initiative were implemented exactly because the need for a ‘discrete shock’ of debt 
relief was acknowledged (Bulow and Rogoff, 1991). Piecemeal operations, as debt-for-




For our Uruguayan case the issue of ‘debt overhang’ is clearly pertinent (as 
already highlighted in Section 3.1), with public debt that was unsustainable, and necessitated a 
major adjustment process. But it remains doubtful whether this particular swap, representing in 
total (combined over the two phases) just over US$20 million in nominal debt service relief over 
a four-year period, was an efficient way of curing debt overhang. It should be evident that the 
private bond exchange operation of April-May 2003 was a far more efficient (and effective) way 
of debt service relief, and tackling debt overhang at that time. At best, the swap contributed only 
marginally to the overall effort.   
 
 
3.4.  Alignment with government policy and with government systems 
 
Debt relief is intuitively very similar to budget support, to the extent that both 
modalities free up additional room in the recipient country’s budget (or at least are meant to do 
so). Donors that want to ensure that these extra funds are put to good use, such as for 
sustainable development purposes, have come up with different ways of keeping control over 
how and on what resources will be spent by the recipient. Over time, control mechanisms and 
conditionality sets attached to aid modalities have undergone significant transformations. In fact, 
debt relief has been at the very forefront of this progression in donor-recipient relations. 
 
Debt-for-nature swaps implemented in the 1980s and 1990s often practised what 
in donor jargon is called ‘micro-earmarking’, with donors dictating priority projects and 
                                                 
24 Of course, to the extent that debt swaps are framed in terms of providing additional resources rather 
than improving the overall debt situation of a country (as they typically are today), this argument is of less 
importance.  
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programmes and trying to follow as closely as possible the flow of resources freed-up by debt 
service cancellation. To make oversight easier, counterpart funds were established outside 
regular budget outlays of the recipient government, together with new management structures 
and externally imposed procedures for planning, implementation, and monitoring and 
evaluation, all circumventing the recipient’s established systems. 
 
Whilst micro-earmarking allowed donors to enhance accountability towards their 
domestic constituencies and tax base, such close surveillance made them myopic, increasing 
chances that recipient country resources were displaced to other budget priorities (in other 
words ‘fungibility’). The creation of parallel systems also suffers from high transaction costs, 
prevents long-term capacity building, and reduces country ownership. 
 
This is why most debt relief, taking place within the HIPC/MDRI framework, has 
evolved to what one could call ‘debt-to-PRSP swaps’ (Cassimon and Vaessen, 2007: 24), 
swapping debt obligations for the debtor country’s commitment to use the realised savings for 
national development priorities as described in its PRSP (or similar national development policy 
documents).
25 Donors now seek to use their influence more indirectly, through a broader policy 
dialogue with their developing country ‘partners’, and to leave tasks of funds allocation, 
planning, budgeting, implementation of projects and programmes, and monitoring and 
evaluation to partner country systems. This ‘New Aid Approach’ (NAA) (see Molenaers and 
Renard, 2009), which was further consolidated in the 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2008 
Accra Agenda for Action
26, promises to bring more ‘policy alignment’ and ‘system alignment’ to 
development cooperation. The former refers to focusing donor support on partner countries’ 
national development strategies, whereas the latter means the use of countries’ own institutions 
and public systems for financial management, implementation, monitoring and evaluation where 
these are deemed effective, accountable and transparent. We now check the Uruguayan case 
against these two alignment principles. 
 
On policy alignment, it is useful to differentiate between, first, issues of control and 
ownership over the project measures and, second, coherence with Uruguay’s environmental 
(and broader developmental) policy agenda. 
  
The bi-national committee acts as the most powerful body in the Spanish-
Uruguayan debt swap set-up; it holds executive power and oversees the whole process (see 
Section 2.3). As said before, the committee is composed of two representatives each of both 
the Uruguayan and Spanish Economics Ministry (a set up which is common practice in other 
swaps brokered by Spain). At the least, this means that the debtor country in question has the 
opportunity to have high-level government officials present when important decisions regarding 
the swap are made.
27  The fact that the Uruguayan Minister of Economics and Finance 
proposed to extend the original agreement with a second swap suggests a degree of control 
and ownership. Further evidence comes from the Technical Assistance Committee in which 
                                                 
25  See footnote 6. Since 1999, the preparation of a PRSP or similar policy document is, besides a 
qualification criterion for debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, a necessary condition for obtaining 
access to new concessional IMF/World Bank loans. 
26 More information and full-text versions of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action can be 
found at  http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_43554003_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
27 When looking at swaps by other creditors, this seems less self-evident than one would perhaps expect. 
In a recent US-Indonesian case, for example, Indonesian government officials were largely under-
represented  in the swap’s dominant oversight committee,  because  they had to make way for 
(international) NGOs (see Cassimon et al., 2011a).   
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both the National Directory of Energy and Nuclear Technology of the Uruguayan Ministry of 
Industry, Energy and Mining and the engineering faculty of UDELAR, two important Uruguayan 
actors, participated. This committee was, among other things, responsible for examining the 
economic and technical feasibility of the wind farm project (including finding a suitable location).  
 
Turning to policy coherence, it should be noted that the Sierra de los Caracoles 
wind farm was the first wind power investment by the state-owned utility company UTE (and, as 
such, the first in Uruguay overall).
28 This is not to say, however, that wind power generation or, 
more generally, renewable energy was not on the Uruguayan agenda. Indeed, according to 
official documents dating from around the time the second swap was signed, the government’s 
strategic priorities in the energy sector included the diversification of energy sources (and 
providers) to reduce costs, emissions and to increase energy security (see e.g. MIEM, 2006 for 
a summary). For its energy consumption Uruguay relies heavily on oil imports. However, most 
electricity  generated in the country itself comes from hydropower plants. To diversify its 
renewable energy mix, Uruguay initially planned to install 200-300 MW of wind power by 2015 
(alongside investments in biomass and solar energy). These goals were recently revised 
upwards, to 500 MW of installed wind farm capacity by 2015. The swap-financed project at 
Sierra de los Carcacoles can thus, in retrospect, be seen as a first step (albeit small) towards 
achieving these ambitions.  
 
Leaving aside the close integration of the swap with Uruguay’s energy policy, 
alignment with the broader development agenda of the government is far less clear. When the 
new left-of-centre administration of Tabaré Vásquez took office in March 2005, the country was 
still recovering from severe economic crisis (see Section 3.1). The administration’s development 
plan, under the name of El Gobierno de Cambio - La Transición Responsable, covered six main 
areas: democracy, social programmes, production, innovation, integration and culture.
29  It 
remains debatable whether, at least at the time the second phase of the debt swap agreement 
was signed, investing in energy  efficiency and security was truly a development priority for 
Uruguay. 
 
With respect to system alignment of the swap, things look less favourable still. As 
in previous debt-for-nature swaps, the ring-fencing arrangements made for the use of Spanish-
Uruguayan debt swap proceeds, such as the establishment of a separate, extra-budgetary 
Spanish-Uruguayan counterpart fund managed by a bi-national committee, could be seen as 
creating a parallel ‘Project Implementation Unit’ (PIU).
30  While clearly involving Uruguayan 
government officials, these arrangements largely bypass existing government institutions and 
public systems. The extra administrative burden on Uruguayan (and Spanish) actors this implies 
is arguably not in proportion to the small size of the debt-for-efficiency swap. 
 
More importantly, the swap puts into practice a pure form of ‘tied aid’ by restricting 
the use of freed-up funds to projects implicating Spanish companies or the import of Spanish 
                                                 
28 Around the same time of the swap-financed Sierra de los Caracoles wind farm project proposal, another 
private project, the Nuevo Manantial 4 MW wind farm in Rocha, was developed by UTE. 
29 Under the social pillar of this plan, for example, the Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social 
(PANES) was initiated, a temporary programme including conditional cash transfers, food assistance and 
public works. 
30  A PIU is defined by  the OECD as  a  ‘dedicated management unit  designed to support the 
implementation and administration of projects or programmes’ (see glossary: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_21571361_39494699_39503763_1_1_1_1,00.html#P).  It is 
now widely accepted that too many parallel PIUs lead to a fragmentation of aid.  
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goods and/or services only.
31 True, the novelty of wind energy generation in Uruguay limited the 
extent to which domestic companies could be involved. This is however not to say that the 
bidding process for the wind farm project could not have been made more competitive, giving 
other non-Spanish manufacturing/construction companies, including those hailing from 






                                                 
31 It should be noted that such tying was less obvious in more recent Spanish debt swaps.  
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4.  DISCUSSION 
 
Our analysis suggests that the Spanish-Uruguayan swap performs unevenly 
across the five different criteria we have considered.  Although well-aligned with Uruguay’s 
energy policy, the swap creates limited additional fiscal space, is too small to create indirect 
benefits, and binds Uruguay to purchase goods and services solely from Spanish companies. 
Even though such case study evidence is, of course, extremely partial, it adds weight to the 
suggestion that debt-for-efficiency swaps may not be learning from the experience of debt 
swaps in other sectors.  
 
Thus, over and above conventional forms of donor finance, this kind of debt swap 
does little to foster substantial development co-benefits. For example, such co-benefits could be 
increased if the swap was structured such that greater external or fiscal space is created 
(through, for example, making  sure there is a positive difference between the debt service 
payments forgiven under the swap and the replacement counterpart payments). Moreover, co-
benefits could be enhanced through ensuring that, if competitive, goods and services could be 
purchased regionally or globally.  
 
However, these shortcomings need to be placed in perspective. From our 
communication with officials it appears that the use of a debt swap in this case acted as a 
‘sweetener’ to clinch the project deal. Without it the wind farm project may not have proceeded. 
In this respect, this debt swap does appear to have improved access to project finance - a key 
criticism of the CDM. This brings us to the wider issue of the kind of role debt swaps could play 
within the climate finance landscape (both mitigation and adaptation).  
 
Article 4.3 of the UNFCCC (1992), to which all negotiating parties are signatories, 
states that the ‘agreed full incremental’ costs of mitigation in developing countries need to be 
met by finance and technology from developed countries. In this respect, the cost burden of 
mitigation measures falls progressively on Annex I countries, pursuant with their ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘capability’. On the adaptation side, the Bali Action Plan of December 2007 stated that 
developed countries agreed to ‘adequate, predictable, and sustainable financial resources and 
the provision of new and additional resources, including official and concessional funding for 
developing country parties’ (UNFCCC, 2008b).
32 Importantly, a subset of Annex  I countries, 
known as Annex II countries (which corresponds to OECD and European Union member 
states)
33, have a particular obligation to provide financial resources and facilitate technology 
transfer to developing countries.  
 
Early estimates of the costs of mitigation in developing countries ranged from 
between US$75 billion a year to around US$400 billion a year (see, for example, UNFCCC, 
2007; UNFCCC, 2008c; World Bank, 2010). The early cost estimates for adaptation in 
developing countries also varied widely, from US$4 billion a year to US$109 billion (see World 
Bank, 2006; Stern, 2007; UNDP, 2007).  
 
                                                 
32 The interpretation of what constitutes ‘new and additional’ has been the subject of much debate. 
33  Annex  II countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the  Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.  
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Putting these estimates together, the World Bank (2010), in its World Development 
Report, suggests a figure of between US$139 and US$175 billion per year for mitigation and 
between US$28 billion and US$100 billion for adaptation by 2030 (in constant 2005 US$). The 
report further estimates current levels of climate finance for mitigation and adaptation as being 
in the region of US$9 billion a year (around US$8  billion for mitigation and U$1 billion for 
adaptation). So, total current funding is only 5% of the lower-bound estimate, or 3% of the 
upper-bound estimate, for 2030.  
 
Finance for mitigation is spread across private and public sources involving both 
market-based mechanisms and innovative instruments (see UNEP, 2009). The World Bank 
(2010) argues that private flows, including foreign direct investment and flows stimulated by 
cap-and-trade schemes, may be able to provide enough investment in the long term, but 
probably not in the short term. Therefore, from this perspective, there is a role for public finance 
to establish the regulatory framework necessary to attract (international) private finance, and to 
provide the right incentives for mitigation and adaptation innovations, pilots and scaling-up 
activities. Whilst domestic public revenues could provide some resources (to enable targeted 
expenditure or subsidies, and tax benefits on investments), the limited fiscal resources of many 
non Annex I countries (and the standpoint of the Framework Convention and Bali Action Plan) 
indicates a substantial role for external public flows in the form of grants or concessional 
finance.  
 
If we use the World Bank’s (2010) estimates that 15% of mitigation funding in 
developing countries and all adaptation funding is from public sources, a ballpark figure for 
external public finance for developing countries in 2030 could be between US$49 and US$126 
billion per year (in constant 2005 US$). This is less than recent levels of total official 
development assistance (ODA) which in 2010 reached an historic high of about US$129 billion 
(OECD-DAC, 2011). To what extent could debt swaps play a role in meeting this financing gap 
on both mitigation and adaptation sides? 
 
Our position on this is outlined in Cassimon et al. (2011a) and runs as follows. On 
the mitigation side, as the HIPC process has ensured that most bilateral and multilateral debt 
owed by many low-income countries should be cancelled in due course, it appears the greatest 
potential for utilising debt swaps for mitigation purposes (such a debt-for-nature or debt-for-
efficiency swaps) will mainly be within lower middle-income countries (where there is less of a 
convincing case for financing mitigation, and less of a finance gap for CDM projects). Moreover, 
we also find numerous actors, including vertical funds, interested in sector-specific swaps such 
that there may be a limited number of appropriate and available titles to be utilised for debt 
swaps for mitigation.  
 
On the adaptation side, one possible approach might be to integrate climate 
concerns into the current HIPC/MDRI framework, thus increasing policymakers’ awareness and 
raising the likelihood that developing countries could include climate concerns when completing 
national development strategies.   
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